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VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
 IN BRIEF 
VOLUME 95 APRIL 20, 2009 PAGES 19-26 
RESPONSE 
CUSTOM, COMEDY, AND THE VALUE OF DISSENT 
Jennifer E. Rothman∗
ROFESSORS Dotan Oliar and Christopher Sprigman's new article 
on quasi-intellectual property norms in the stand-up comedy world 
provides yet another compelling example of the phenomenon that I have 
explored in which the governing intellectual property regime takes a 
backseat to social norms and other industry customs that dominate the 
lived experiences of many in creative fields.1 Their insightful treatment 
of the microcosm of comics reinforces my concern that customs are 
being used to expand IP law both inside and outside the courtroom.2 I 
am particularly appreciative of the editors of the Virginia Law Review 
for inviting this brief response, which allows me to build upon my work 
on the use of customs and norms in IP. 
P 
Although Oliar and Sprigman do not use the term “custom,” I think it 
is important to recognize that custom includes not only industry 
practices, but also the social norms that interest Oliar and Sprigman.3 
Oliar and Sprigman make few specific recommendations as to how the 
law should engage with the norms they document. Nevertheless, they 
 
* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
1 See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 
Va. L. Rev. 1787 (2008); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in 
Intellectual Property, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1899, 1903, 1906 (2007). 
2 Id. at 1906. 
3 Id. at 1900 n.1. 
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suggest that lawmakers and judges should “consider” seriously the 
existence of such norms.4 This leaves too much room for such norms to 
be incorporated into the law as governing customs—something I have 
resoundingly criticized except in the most narrow of circumstances.5 
Oliar and Sprigman suggest that Congress should consider the norms of 
stand-up comedy because those norms provide incentives to create 
without reliance on the formal legal structure of copyright law. 
Accordingly, they suggest that Congress should resist expanding IP law 
because the social norms already fill the legal gaps. 
I will organize this response as follows: First, I will consider why the 
existence of social norms does not adequately challenge the incentive 
rationale, and therefore does not provide a compelling basis for 
Congressional restraint. Second, I will consider whether the norms that 
have developed in the stand-up community are worthy of judicial or 
legislative deference (without regard to their incentive effect). Finally, I 
will consider what, if anything, the law should do to interrupt the 
restrictive norms that Oliar and Sprigman identify. 
CHALLENGING COPYRIGHT'S INCENTIVE RATIONALE 
Oliar and Sprigman challenge the traditional story that without 
copyright protection there would be no incentive to create. Professor 
Sprigman has already convincingly made this point in the context of the 
fashion industry.6 What is particularly interesting about stand-up 
comedy, in contrast to fashion, however, is that Oliar and Sprigman have 
identified a field where copyright law actually does apply (albeit not as 
robustly as some comics might like), but is generally not utilized. Oliar 
and Sprigman contend that the norm system provides quasi-IP protection 
for jokes and thereby furnishes incentives for comics to produce jokes 
and indeed, to become comics in the first place. 
Oliar and Sprigman convincingly argue that where the law is absent—
either by design or choice (and in comedy it seems both apply)—norms 
may step in to provide incentives to create. I think Oliar and Sprigman 
are absolutely correct that social norms are an “overlooked source of 
4 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1794, 1833–34. 
5 Rothman, supra note 1, at 1902–03, 1906, 1930–67. 
6 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual 
Property in Fashion Design, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687 (2006); see also Emmanuelle Fauchart & 
Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 
19(2) Org. Sci. 187 (2008). 
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incentive[s] to create.”7 This conclusion, however, does not call into 
question the traditional incentive-based justification for copyright law. 
One might even contend that the norms-based incentive story in the 
stand-up world justifies more robust federal copyright protection for 
jokes. After all, if the norms are great at encouraging production, 
wouldn't delineating such norms more clearly (through precedent or 
legislation) lead to the production of even more jokes? Although I don't 
think that is what Oliar and Sprigman had in mind, it is a reasonable 
conclusion from their findings. 
A second reason that the stand-up comedy norms do not call into 
question the copyright system's traditional role is that the norms have 
developed in tandem with the copyright system itself. Comics are aware 
of copyright law's existence; in fact, the stand-up world is largely 
supported by works robustly protected by copyright law, such as 
television shows, cable specials, and movies, which are the primary 
vehicles by which comics achieve fame and fortune. Oliar and Sprigman 
note that some of the norms specifically relate to such media—for 
example, the first-to-TV joke ownership norm.8 This reality leaves me 
skeptical that the norms do as much work as Oliar and Sprigman suggest 
that they do. 
Finally, one could question whether the norms have any role in 
encouraging creation. Oliar and Sprigman concede as much by noting 
that it is difficult to disentangle socio-cultural and personal incentives to 
create from a norm-driven incentive system.9 Of course this critique is 
one that I and others, including Sprigman, have given credit to 
elsewhere, and it applies with equal force to norms and the overall 
copyright system. 
THE LIMITED VALUE OF CUSTOMS IN STAND-UP COMEDY 
Although Oliar and Sprigman suggest that Congress and courts 
should consider the value of norms, they provide no framework for 
evaluating whether norms are deserving of such consideration. As I have 
discussed elsewhere, courts do not currently engage in a sophisticated 
analysis of when customs should be considered and instead often 
incorporate them into the law without reflection.10 To combat this 
7 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1831. 
8 Id. at 1826. 
9 See id. at 1818 (quoting a performer who describes his primary motivation as the “love 
of the craft”); id. at 1855 (describing potential cultural factors in the evolution of stand-up 
comedy). 
10 Rothman, supra note 1, at 1902–03, 1906, 1930–67. 
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problem, I have offered a theoretical framework for determining whether 
a custom provides useful information worthy of some judicial 
consideration. This framework situates customs along six main vectors: 
the certainty of the custom, the motivation for the custom, the 
representativeness of the custom, how the custom is applied (both 
against whom and for what proposition), and the implications of the 
custom's adoption.11
Before embarking on a vector-by-vector analysis of the comedy 
norms, it is worth noting that although comedy norms may superficially 
seem similar to those of the fan fiction and haute cuisine chef worlds 
that I have considered elsewhere, they are different in some important 
ways.12 Unlike the chef and fan fiction norms, the comedy norms do not 
appear to be driven by interest in a fair allocation of rights. Instead, they 
seem one-sided, focused solely on a joke's originator, without 
consideration of the potential needs of users or independent creators of 
similar or related jokes. The norms of the fan fiction and high-end chef 
communities are more adapted to balancing the interests of creators with 
those of users. In each of those communities, an attribution norm—
rather than a prohibition norm—is the standard. While comics try to shut 
down second-comers, chefs and fan fiction authors encourage use of 
their creations by others so long as appropriate attribution is given. 
One could argue that comedy is different—any use by another of a 
similar joke could destroy the value of the joke—and therefore the more 
even-handed, open-access approach of haute cuisine and fan fiction 
would not work. This might be correct, but these highly restrictive 
customs suggest great caution should be taken in incorporating comedy 
norms into the law and, particularly, in applying them outside of 
comedy. 
Certainty 
To have any value, a custom must be certain.13 Oliar and Sprigman's 
description of the comedy norms suggests that there is agreement and 
some uniformity with regard to their substance and scope. Nevertheless, 
the sample for their study, nineteen comics, is quite small; before 
concluding that there is no dissent on the dominant norms I would want 
11 Id. at 1907–08, 1967–80. 
12 Id. at 1924–26. 
13 Id. at 1968. 
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to see more conclusive evidence. Additionally, they provide some 
prominent examples of comics who reject the norms, including Robin 
Williams. Such high profile rejections suggest that there are active 
dissenters from the purportedly “uniform” norms. Moreover, it appears 
that more powerful and successful comics may not need to follow the 
norms. Such power inequities in the development and application of the 
norms raise red flags about the value of those customs. Given the 
frequency of joke theft—as evidenced by the examples that Oliar and 
Sprigman provide—there cannot be said to be universal conformity with 
the norms. At best, one could say the norms are somewhat certain, but 
hardly unanimously accepted. They are therefore of some, but not great, 
value in establishing an appropriate allocation of quasi-property and use 
rights in the comedy world. 
Motivation 
Customary practices or norms that develop with the express purpose 
of formulating an aspirational set of practices should be given more 
weight than those that develop simply to avoid litigation or to preserve 
relationships.14 Although the comedy norms have an implicit 
deontological component that suggests what comics think is just, the 
comics' practices are also largely driven by reluctance to engage in a 
poorly understood and prohibitively expensive legal regime. I have 
contended elsewhere that when such litigation-avoidance strategies drive 
industry practices and norms, they should be disfavored as legal 
standards or rules governing IP rights because they are driven by risk 
aversion rather than aspirational motives.15 Moreover, even the more 
normative components of the comedy norms are hardly aspirational in 
the sense that I have used that term to implicate preferred customs. The 
comics' norms do not try to delineate what are legitimate versus 
illegitimate uses—something that requires balancing the interests of 
owners and users—but instead only protect the first comic to publicly 
perform a premise for a joke. As such, the comedy norms have little to 
offer courts or legislative bodies in interpreting or developing IP. 
Representativeness 
Customs that develop with a diverse representation of interests should 
be given more credence than those that are driven by self-interested 
14 Id. at 1970–72. 
15 Id. 
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subgroups.16 From Oliar and Sprigman's description, it seems that the 
stand-up norms have developed with a broad-base of comics' 
involvement and, accordingly, are fairly representative. They note, 
however, that comics are hardly a close-knit group, but instead an 
“intermediate-knit” one.17 Moreover, their findings suggest that the 
norms may not apply, or may apply differently, to very successful 
comics. The norms also seem to have formed with little formality or 
opportunity for discussion or objection, making true evaluation of 
representativeness challenging. Overall, however, the customs seem 
somewhat representative. 
Application: Against Whom 
A custom should generally only be applied against parties who 
participated in its development or, at least, who were adequately 
represented in the development of that custom.18 While the stand-up 
community is fairly small, not all comics know one another. 
Accordingly, the norms involved do not rise to the level of a negotiated 
contract that should be enforced against all comics. Nevertheless, when 
the norms are applied within the stand-up community in the context of 
stand-up they have the most value. Applying such limiting norms to 
newcomers, comics outside of stand-up, other creators, or the public, 
however, would be troubling. Oliar and Sprigman do not describe 
enforcement of the norms in these contexts, but further study about 
whether there have been efforts to enforce these norms outside of the 
stand-up circuit might be illuminating. 
Application: For What Proposition 
When customs are motivated by aspirational goals they may have 
some value for determining what is fair or reasonable. When applied for 
nonnormative propositions, customary practices developed for 
nonnormative reasons may also have some value. Custom also may 
provide relevant information when used to interpret contracts and 
agreements between parties.19
16 Id. at 1972–73. 
17 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1794. 
18 Rothman, supra note 1, at 1974. 
19 Id. at 1975–76. 
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Given the motivations for the development of stand-up norms 
discussed above, the norms should have the most value when used to 
interpret express contracts. The norms are also potentially useful 
evidence in trademark cases. The example that Oliar and Sprigman give 
of Jeff Foxworthy being able to protect his redneck jokes is in keeping 
with this analysis: the fact that comics customarily give a comedian a 
wide territory of joke ownership suggests that the public might be 
confused by another person or comic using Foxworthy's redneck shtick. 
Implications 
One of the dominant and most troubling norms of the comedy circuit 
is the norm against joke stealing. Oliar and Sprigman frame this in a 
normative fashion—no doubt adopting the terminology of the culture—
as “stealing.” The impact of the use of this term should not be lost on us; 
let me take a moment to unpack what joke “stealing” is all about and to 
delineate its parameters. Oliar and Sprigman describe the prohibition on 
joke stealing as including prohibitions on independently created but 
similar jokes, jokes with similar premises, or broadly similar ideas or 
concepts. Those parameters make the joke stealing prohibition a 
prohibition on anything that comedians perceive as similar to, even if 
not originating with, a joke that another comic has told. Joke “stealing” 
is really a misnomer then—joke resemblance would be more accurate. 
Enforcing the joke resemblance ban in the stand-up comedy circuit 
might not be tragic—though it would limit jokes and perhaps prevent the 
best jokes from developing. But prohibiting the use of similar ideas, 
whether independently derived or not, is highly problematic. It shuts 
down free speech, free expression, and free will. It far exceeds what is 
barred by copyright law and—unless there is likely confusion as to 
origin or sponsorship—trademark law as well. In addition, comedy 
norms reject principles of fair use and put no limitation on the duration 
of protection. Accordingly, adopting the comedy norms either within or 
outside comedy via court precedents or congressional legislation would 
have severe drawbacks. 
In sum, the application of these vectors to the norms developed in 
stand-up comedy suggests that while the customs have some value, they 
should not be viewed as particularly valuable customs deserving of 
either legal deference or adoption by Congress. Moreover, they should 
certainly not be applied to those outside of the comedy in-group. 
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THE VALUE OF DISSENT 
As I have said elsewhere, we “cannot abdicate the boundaries of IP 
rights to delineation by privately developed customary practices.”20 
Nevertheless, I am hesitant to advocate direct intervention by the formal 
legal regime to disrupt restrictive norms. The legal system should, 
however, support challenges to these norms by standing guard for those 
individuals who want to dissent. In fact, this is an important 
counterpoint role that courts should serve. Rather than enforcing 
customs, courts could begin to reject customs that overly limit users 
rights by, for example, preventing any enforcement of idea-theft claims 
in the comedy world. 
Encouraging dissent will allow more movement of norms within a 
field, and prevent the norms themselves from shutting down creativity 
and expression. Those comics who currently have reputations as joke-
stealers—like Robin Williams—might try to rehabilitate themselves as 
dissenters from the restrictive comedy norms, as comics who think 
independent creation is impossible, ideas are “free as the air,” and 
creativity paramount. Courts and Congress should provide space for 
such dissenters, and the comedy community should keep an open mind, 
in addition to its open mic. 
 
20 Id. at 1982. 
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